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We investigate how entrepreneurs in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine finance start-up and 
restructuring. The data come from a recent enterprise survey covering 600 firms equally 
stratified in de novo and privatised or state–owned firms. We find that the personal funds of 
the main owner(s) are of crucial importance. Less than one tenth of the firms used a bank 
loan. Vouchers are important for financing privatisation and restructuring. The state still 
holds an important stake in the capital, though diminishing gradually over time. State support 
for start-up was rare. However, when it occurred, the share in start-up capital was important.  
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  2FINANCING FIRM START-UP AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
TRANSITION COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM BELARUS, 




On the basis of new data from an enterprise survey, we investigate 
how entrepreneurs in post-communist transition countries finance the 
start-up and restructuring of their firms. We investigate whether the 
type of financing strategy is related to entrepreneurial characteristics, 
controlling for effects such as size, sector, age, macro-economic 
environment and the timing of the start-up or restructuring in the 
transition process. The survey covers the enterprise evolution since 
the start-up of the firm under transition. In case of state owned and 
privatised enterprises, which started operation before the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, the data cover the last two years of communist rule 
under Perestroika as well.  
 
The issue of enterprise finance and entrepreneurship in transition 
economies is extremely important for three basic reasons. First, it 
effects the core of the transition process, namely the creation of the 
private enterprise sector. Second, looking at established market 
economies, which eventually serve as a model for the transition 
countries, there is still an ongoing debate whether it is finance or 
entrepreneurial talent and activity that matters for the start-up, growth 
and survival of the firm. The debate dates back to the dispute between 
Frank Knight, 1921, and Josef Schumpeter, 1934, over the nature of 
entrepreneurship. Third, the way it effects private sector creation 
determines the policy options needed to promote the transition 
process.  
 
Taking into account that, contrary to those in established market 
economies the financial markets in most transition countries and 
especially the former Soviet republics are at their infancy (see e.g. 
EBRD 1998; Leijonhufvud, A. and Rühl, C., 1997), financing 
enterprise start-up and restructuring is a crucial and challenging issue 
  3to be investigated. The following set of factors is only a brief 
summary of the key fields in which the CIS transition economies 
differ from established market economies.  
 
1. Associated with the early development stage is a relatively larger 
problem of asymmetric information than in the mature Western 
capital markets (Corricelli et al. 1996).  
 
2. Low savings at the start of transition were eroded by inflation.  
 
3. A young and immature housing market with little turnover causes 
problems of finding collateral
1.  
 
4. This would leave privatisation as an important vehicle to obtain 
personal equity and wealth. Yet these programs are not completely 
finished in the countries under study, in contrast to the Central 
European economies (EBRD, 1998).  
 
5. There was relatively little entrepreneurial experience of operating a 
firm in a market type of environment. Under communist planning no 
private start-ups were allowed. Only small-scale agriculture and 
handcraft activities were allowed (Liuhto, K., 1999). There was 
experience in trade under communist planning, mainly to bridge the 
gaps of inefficient production, yet these activities are quite different 
from starting and developing an enterprise, and sharing the risk and 
uncertainties oneself. Since under communist rule there was little or 
no room for developing and managing a private business, especially 
in the former republics of the Soviet Union, one expects that the 
entrepreneurial know-how is of a lower level than in established 
market economies with a history of generations with entrepreneurial 
experience.  
 
Consequently an apparent paradox arises. The factors mentioned 
above point to a difficult climate to get wealth to start a firm. This in 
turn generates a great need for external equity or debt finance. Yet 
following de Mezo and Webb, 1990, low self-finance signals a bad 
  4project quality (bad entrepreneurship), generating a lower probability 
of obtaining external finance. There is virtually no record of 
entrepreneurial success. The earliest private firms started operation no 
earlier than the start of transition in 1991. And yet, the private sector 
has grown relatively rapidly in terms of number of firms. The basic 
question that emerges, then, is how entrepreneurs finance start-up and 
restructuring?  
 
In the next section we present the theoretical and analytical 
background to get a better grasp of the issue. Current theoretical 
insights, however, are mainly based on empirical evidence from 
established market economies. It is useful to look briefly at the 
existing evidence for transition countries. The fourth section 
documents the general characteristics of the survey that we used to 
answer the above questions. The fifth section presents the analytical 
evidence. This is followed by concluding comments. 
 
2. Analytical  Background 
 
Several studies of established market economies suggest that 
entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 
1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990; Holtz-Eakin, et al, 1994a,b.; 
Lindh and Ohlsson, 1994; Van Praag and Van Ophem, 1995). They 
suggest that becoming an entrepreneur depends crucially on personal 
wealth. Insufficient funds prevent the start as an entrepreneur, or 
generate a start at a sub-optimal asset level. In the context of 
asymmetric information the latter generates lower growth rates and 
shorter survival rates, as recently shown by Brito and Mello, 1995.  
 
Capital market imperfections due to asymmetric information limit the 
possibilities to obtain external finance (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Because entrepreneurial quality and effort are not easily observed and 
measured by banks, nor the profitability of a business plan, credit 
rationing tends to prevail, in which case a debt-gap emerges. 
Consequently firms might be restricted in their investments and in 
their growth. Ultimately this might lead to earlier exit compared to a 
  5situation where firms do not need external finance or where there is 
less asymmetric information. Commonly used mechanisms to dilute 
the asymmetric information problem are: 1) the request for collateral, 
2) looking for a track record of past entrepreneurial successes, 3) the 
equity stake in the entrepreneur is business (de Meza and Webb, 
1990; Cressy, 1995), and 4) the development of a close working 
relationship between lender/investor and borrower
2 (Binks and 
Ennew, 1996). Yet liquidity constraints effect all these instruments in 
a negative way, limiting the potential to bridge the asymmetric 
information gap and to obtain external finance.  
 
Contrary to liquidity constraint hypotheses, recent evidence suggests 
that the basic determinant of success in terms of growth and survival 
is human capital. Indeed a crucial ingredient in the relationship 
between lender/investor and borrower is the ability of both parties to 
provide each other with relevant information (Binks and Ennew, 
1996). Yet this in turn depends on their capability and know-how, as 
bankers/investors and as entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur must be able 
to convince the banker or candidate investor that his business will 
compensate for the risk attached to it and that he can pay back the 
loan or the expected return on the investment. The banker/investor 
must have the ability to distinguish between good and bad loans or 
investments.  
 
Another way entrepreneurial know-how enters the finance relation is 
through self-selection. The entrepreneur can decide himself not to 
apply for a loan or for external equity finance rather than having the 
bank turn down his request for finance. Using a sample of start-ups in 
the UK, Cressy (1996) argues that the provision of external finance is 
demand driven and that firms self-select for funds on the basis of the 
human capital of the entrepreneur. He finds that both the assets at 
start-up and the survival of the firm is positively correlated with the 
proprietors’ age and the team size, and that it is basically these human 
capital variables that determine survival. Older entrepreneurs have 
more experience, business commitment, assets and more willingness 
to use them for collateral (Cressy, 1995). Investigating the growth 
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(1998) found that firms deliberately choose to circumvent the actual 
and perceived inadequacies in the capital market by matching the 
growth to internal cash flow or through acquisitions. Sustained 
growers more frequently applied this strategy than the other group. 
Furthermore in cases were external finance was provided it was 
perceived to have a constraining influence on growth.  
 
3.  Evidence from Existing Studies in Transition Countries 
 
While the importance of finance and human capital for start-up 
survival and growth of the firm in established market economies is 
still an ongoing debate, to our current knowledge little empirical 
evidence on that subject for post-communist countries has been 
presented. The results of the studies that are related to this subject 
vary according to area, method and class of firm size. Yet none of 
these directly investigate the relation between firm finance and 
entrepreneurship. A number of studies, however,  investigate the 
financing of investments and restructuring of the firms. Since this is 
one aspect of our subject, the main findings are briefly presented. 
 
The evidence on credit rationing for the Central European countries is 
mixed. Cornelli et al. (1996), find clear evidence of credit rationing 
for large firms in Poland, but remain less conclusive about Hungary. 
Lizal and Svejnar (1998), conclude that investment behaviour of large 
firms in the Czech Republic is not well explained by cash flow or 
constraints in finance. They add that this is not the case for small 
firms. Bratkowski, Grosfeld, and Rostowski (1999), study the effect 
of finance on investment for a sample of de novo firms, mostly small 
sized, in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They find that the 
provision of external finance for de novo forms works well. 
Substantial amounts of credit are provided to de novo firms on the 
basis of collateral, and this from an early stage onwards. They also 
conclude that the lack of external finance does not seem to be a major 
impediment for the growth of the firms under study.  
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Ukraine. The evidence is mixed as well, yet points more towards 
credit constraints than in the Central European countries. Looking at 
the demand and supply of bank credit in Russia for medium-sized and 
large firms Fan et al. (1996) argue that banks are “soft” in providing 
credit. They find evidence of adverse selection in that firms that hold 
bank loans are on average financially less healthy. Nevertheless, some 
banks were reported to be starting to take creditworthiness into 
consideration by requiring collateral. Filatotchev et al. (1996), report 
for a sample of privatised Ukrainian firms that restructuring was 
preferably financed by retained profits. Bank lending was mostly 
limited to short term loans intended to bridge the gap in working 
capital needs. Webster et al. (1994) found similar evidence for a set of 
medium-sized and large firms in Russia. Almost half of the 
entrepreneurs wanted to finance future investment by internal profits. 
Although at the time of the survey long-term loans were not available, 
many managers explained that they would not be willing to accept a 
long-term loan because of the high risk and the high uncertainty of 
future economic evolution in Russia; a view that proved to be sound. 
According to the empirical approach of Fazzari et al. (1988), the 
sensitivity of investments to cash flow points to the existence of 
financing constraints.  
 
The studies referred to above do not inquire about the start-up of the 
firms. Yet it is obvious from the literature covering mature market 
economies that this is an important aspect of private sector 
development. Surveys querying the opinion of the managers find that 
for small firms there is a lack of investment finance. Isakova and 
Klochto (1995) report that Ukrainian entrepreneurs cited the lack of 
finance as the number one constraint for business start-up.  
 
To conclude, empirical findings in the existing literature on transition 
economies can be summarised as follows
3: 
1. There is mixed evidence for the existence of credit constraints 
amoung the Central European countries. The evidence suggests a 
higher probability that firms in CIS countries suffer from credit 
  8market imperfections compared to those in the Central European 
countries. 
2. There is mixed evidence for the existence of adverse selection in 
the credit markets of the transition countries. 
3. Large and medium sized firms seem to have better access to 
external finance than the small, mostly de novo, firms. 
4.  Quite a number of entrepreneurs preferred to finance future 
investments with retained earnings, and did not apply for a bank 
loan. 
5. Surveys that explicitly asked the manager’s opinion confirmed that 
there was a great need for start-up or investment capital, yet that it 
was costly to obtain this through external finance. 
 
4. The  Data 
 
The data come from an enterprise survey done in the second half of 
1997 in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine in the framework of the above-
mentioned project. The questionnaire covered aspects of ownership, 
finance, management and entrepreneurship, labour, production and 
basic information about the firm and the respondent. (For a detailed 
description of the questionnaire, see Bilsen and Mitina, 1998). 
 
We focussed on particular regions (oblasts) that are important for the 
respective economies: Minsk and Gomel in Belarus, Kiev and East 
Ukraine in Ukraine and St.-Petersburg in Russia. Kiev and Minsk are 
capital cities where the headquarters of banks are located, and host the 
newly founded stock markets. Gomel and East Ukraine are industrial 
centres marked by heavy industry that were important pillars of the 
Soviet economy in the heydays of communist rule
4. Nowadays these 
regions face enormous restructuring needs (see e.g. Van Zon, 1998; 
Simtchenko, 1999). St.-Petersburg is the second largest economic 
centre of Russia, benefiting from its position as one of Russia’s most 
important harbours.  
 
The whole sample consists of 600 firms of which 150 are in Belarus, 
150 in Kiev, 150 in East Ukraine and 150 in St.-Petersburg. Within 
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enterprises (de novo firms) and firms that started operation before the 
start of transition. The latter consist of state owned enterprises and 
privatised enterprises. De novo firms were sampled from the 
manufacturing, trade and service sectors. State owned and privatised 
enterprises were mainly drawn from the manufacturing sector
5. No 
restriction was imposed on the distribution between state owned and 
privatised enterprises.  
 
The enterprises were selected from national business registers and 
local address books by the researchers involved in the project. The 
last source proved very useful to sample de novo firms, which are 
quite often micro firms that are too small to be registered in the 
national business register. Furthermore it helped to avoid ‘paper’ 
enterprises that were not operational. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
firms in the sample by country, firm type and size.  
 
Note that the number of de novo firms and pre-transition firms is not 
the same as imposed by the sampling strategy. The stratification and 
selection of the firms for interview was made on the basis of the 
information from the business registers and local address books. After 
doing the interviews more detailed information about the ownership 
structure and the history of the firm was available that allowed us to 
make a more accurate classification.  
 
Some firms in the category of state owned enterprises and privatised 
enterprises have a small number of employees. There are two reasons 
for this. The first is that our definition of state owned enterprises 
includes firms that are fully owned by the municipalities. These are 
often small and even micro enterprises. The second reason is that we 
capture in our sample firms that were set-up under the Perestroika 
regime as well. Managers were allowed to set up enterprises using 
leased assets from the state (Liuhto, 1999). De facto, the managers 
took strong leadership of the existing firms while de jure the state was 
still the full owner (EBRD, 1998). It was also permitted to set-up 
small enterprises with private funds and means. In our sample were 
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27 employees. The large de novo firm in St.-Petersburg is a subsidiary 
of a foreign company that received foreign direct investment, 
producing mainly for the Russian market. The one in Belarus is a 
booming service firm in the industrial region of Gomel.  
 
The size classes of the de novo enterprises are comparable over the 
countries. Yet in the pre-transition firms regional differences can be 
observed in the sample. First, in Belarus more than 60 per cent of the 
pre-transition firms are still fully state owned. This is consistent with 
the slow privatisation process in this country (EBRD, 1998), and with 
the increased state control in the second half of the transition period 
(Simtchenko, 1999). The distribution between privatised and state 
owned enterprises for the other regions is similar. Second, both the 
privatised and state owned enterprises seem to be larger in St.-
Petersburg than in Ukraine. However statistically, the means are not 
significantly different at the 5% rejection level.  
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the firms by sector and country. The 
concentration of state owned and privatised firms in the 
manufacturing sector, and of de novo firms in trade and services, is 
mainly a consequence of the sample stratification. Although not the 
prime target sectors for sampling pre-transition firms, almost 20% of 
these firms were operative in trade or services. Furthermore about 
20% of the state and privatised firms operated in more than one 
sector, even though these are defined in broad terms. More than half 
of the multi-sector firms are de novo enterprises.  
 
The respondents were in most of the cases persons with an influential 
position in the company. They were managers and/or owners of the 
company. Only 31 of the 600 questionnaires were answered by staff 
members, mostly accountants and engineers. For de novo firms the 
respondent was often the owner-founder of the company. In pre-
transition firms top managers provided the answers, often assisted by 
their chiefs of the accounting or finance department.  
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firms. Since we investigate the financing of firm start-up, it is 
interesting to know in which year the firm was founded. It gives an 
indirect indication about the economic and financial market 
environment at start-up. It immediately shows as well the age of the 
firm and consequently its success as an entrepreneurial entity in 
surviving in the transition environment. One has to bear in mind that 
the survey was done six years after the start of transition in the CIS 
countries. Firms that exited the market before this point in time could 
not be sampled. To the degree that the characteristics of the exiting 
firms were different from the surviving firms the results are 
conditional (Dunne et al, 1989). One can also argue that six years is 
sufficient to miss the initial stock adjustment effects and disturbances 
immediately after the start of transition.  
 
Table 3 gives an overview of the start-up cohorts by firm type. The 
pre-transition period was split into the years under communist 
planning, and the years under Perestroika
6. Opportunities for firm 
management differed under Perestroika from the preceding period 
(Liuhto, 1999). As already argued, traces can be found in the size 
distribution of the pre-transition firms in our sample
7. 
 
No de novo firms started under communist planning or Perestroika. 
An interesting feature is that some state and privatised firms were 
started under transition. Municipalities can set up fully-owned 
enterprises, in which case they are classified as state owned, or partly 
owned, in which case they are classified as privatised enterprises. 
New state and privatised firms can also come from the split-up of a 
larger state enterprise, often in the process of restructuring. 
 
5.  How is Start-up and Restructuring Financed? 
 
In order to answer this question we listed all de novo firms as start-
ups and the privatised enterprises as restructuring firms. One can 
argue that state owned enterprises restructure as well. However one of 
the crucial factors for firm governance, namely ownership of the 
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the present analysis.  
 
We asked the respondents to indicate the percentage distribution of 
various types of funds used for the start-up or for the privatisation of 
the firm. Obviously state owned enterprises by definition were not 
privatised and their start-up was completely financed by the state. We 
report therefore for de novo and privatised firms only. The last option 
of the question allowed to fill in an unnamed source and to specify its 
weight. Table 4 shows the various financial sources and the 
corresponding averages by type of firm.  
 
A first observation is that new firm start-up is in nine out of ten cases 
financed by the owner’s savings. It usually is the largest portion in the 
start-up capital. One fourth of the new firms seek additional capital 
from friends and family. When used, its share in the start-up capital is 
rather low, yet the frequency of this source is the second highest after 
Own Savings. Less than one tenth of the new private firms used debt 
to finance start-up. Yet in cases where loans were obtained, they 
covered on average almost half of the start-up capital. Investment 
from other private firms is the third most frequently used source for 
financing start-up. Foreign investment only occurred in 10% of the de 
novo firms in our sample. However, when foreign funds were 
attracted, they represented on average a majority share in the start-up 
capital, sufficient for controlling the firm
8. Only 3 % of the new 
private firms received support from a government program. Yet on 
average it constituted almost half of the start-up capital. “Other” 
financial resources for novo firms cover, among others, savings from 
employees, contributions from social organisations, and trade union 
funds.  
 
The most important private financial source for financing 
privatisation appears to be the savings of the main owner. In almost 
half of the privatised firms it represents more than 55% of the capital 
of the privatised firm. The second most frequently used private 
financial source is privatisation vouchers. They are used in about one 
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capital. Privatisation vouchers are distributed in two forms: Private 
Property Certificates and Compensation Certificates. Both are 
distributed for free. They can be used in auctions to bid or pay for 
assets that were designated for privatisation. In Auctions using the 
Private Property Certificates, preferential treatment is reserved for the 
personnel of the enterprise and its management. This often resulted in 
insider privatisation (OECD, 1997, p. 21), which is consonant with 
our findings. Investments from other private firms is the third most 
frequently used financial source, but on average the participation in 
the privatisation capital is lower.  
 
It is noteworthy that in more than half of the privatised firms, state 
owned assets still constitute a crucial part of the total firm capital at 
the time of privatisation. The finding is consistent over all countries. 
This suggests that the privatisation process measured in terms of 
numbers of firms gives an over-optimistic picture of the transfer of 
enterprise assets into private hands. To find out whether this is a 
temporary or permanent feature, we looked at the share of total assets 
owned by the state at the moment of the interview
9. For those firms 
that reported state owned assets at the time of privatisation, the 
average share declined from 65.2 % to 14.7% at the moment of the 
interview. This indicates that the relatively high share of the state in 
privatising enterprises is a temporary phenomenon, and that 
privatisation is a gradual process rather than an overnight swap of 





We investigated how entrepreneurs in transition countries financed 
start-up, and restructuring. Data of 215 de novo firms and 291 
privatised firms are used to provide an empirical answer. The data 
come from an enterprise survey done in 1997 in Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine. The main findings are that under the conditions of immature 
capital markets, the personal savings of the owner were of crucial 
  14importance for financing both the start-up of new enterprises and the 
privatisation of state enterprises. Loans from banks were taken out in 
less than one in ten firms. A higher percentage of de novo firms 
obtained a bank loan than privatised firms. The asymmetric 
information problem at the start of the enterprise was bridged by 
borrowing from friends and family. This points to the importance of 
relational capital in the emerging financial market environment. 
Supplier credit and foreign capital was of comparable importance for 
private firm start-ups as bank loans. Few new private firms received 
such support in the start-up of their firm, but in the cases in which it 
occurred, the contribution was almost half of the start-up capital.  
 
Voucher privatisation was found to be the second most important 
financial source in the privatisation and restructuring of previously 
state owned enterprises. We found that at the moment of privatisation, 
in the majority of cases the state still held an important stake in the 
capital. Yet this diminished gradually over time. Foreign capital, 
supplier credit and bank loans were far less important for privatised 
firms than for de novo firms. Cross investments from other private 
firms was often reported to make a major contribution to firm start-up 
and privatisation capital.  
 
Taking into account that the survey was done before the outbreak of 
the Russian financial crisis in August 1998, one might expect that the 
probability of debt financing would diminish considerably, especially 
in Russia. This would mean that future enterprise development and 
restructuring would be more dependent on internal funding, and 
consequently on entrepreneurial qualities to keep the firm alive. 
Suggestions for further research are therefore to investigate the 
relation between entrepreneurial capital and financial capital in 
transition countries.  
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1.  The importance of collateral for firm start-up has been clearly 
illustrated in Black, de Meza and Jeffreys, 1996. 
 
2.  On the condition that it is a deliberate and credible strategy of 
both parties to do so.  
 
3.  Note that all the studies mentioned are based on survey evidence 
before the start of the Russian financial crisis in August 1998. 
 
4.  East Ukraine has its stock exchange as well in Donetsk, yet it 
has a lower trading volume than the Kiev International Stock 
Exchange and the Ukrainian Stock Exchange, both hosted in 
Kiev. 
 
5.  Under communist planning trade was in the hands of trade 
organisations that were controlled by the ministries. Each had a 
monopoly in the whole Soviet Union for a certain range of 
goods. Finance and distribution services were also organised 
that way. After the start of transition, these organisations were 
abolished, making them irrelevant for sampling, or transformed 
into smaller units.  
 
6.  Perestroika means ‘restructuring’ or ‘rebuilding’. It was 
launched by M. Gorbachev at the 27
th Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986. The 
laws that gave the managers the possibility to start and 
restructure enterprises were put in place in 1987, (Liuhto, 1999). 
Enterprises that started in the years 1987 to 1990 are therefore 
considered as start-ups under the Perestroika period.  
 
7.  The year of independence from the Soviet Union is taken as the 
starting year of transition. Ukraine declared itself independent in 
August 1991, Belarus in July 1991. 
 
  168.  For a detailed study of the effects of foreign direct investment 
on firm performance see: Bilsen and Vanmaldegem, 1999. 
 
9.  Which is later than the date of privatisation. 
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Note: The data on employment are those for the year 1996.  Source: own calculations. 
 
 Table 2: The distribution of firms by sector  












De Novo  
Nr. (%) 
Manufacturing  267  44.5  41 (15%)  139 (52%)  87 (33%) 
Trade  77  12.8  10 (11%)  17 (22%)  50 (65%) 
Services  96  16.0  20 (21%)  13 (6%)  63 (66%) 
Construction  11  1.8  1 (9%)  5 (45.5%)  5 (45.5%) 
Multiple sectors  149  24.8  22 (15%)  41 (28%)  86 (58%) 
Total  600  100.0  94 (16%)  215 (36%)  291 (48%) 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Table 3: Enterprises by year of start-up and type
(1) 
Period and year of 
starting production 
Nr. of firms 
State owned       Privatised               De novo 
Share in total 
sample (%) 
Communist rule  62 166  0  39 
Perestroika  7 10 13  5 
Transition       
1991 2  5  28  6 
1992 7  9  33  8 
1993 1  4  50  9 
1994 4  7  60  12 
1995 2  2  56  10 
1996 3  6  41  9 
1997  3 1 8  2 
Total  91 210 289  100 
(1) Start-up is defined as the date of starting production.  For 10 firms the starting date of 
operation was not provided.  Source: own calculations.   
 
 Table 4: Financial sources for the start-up of de novo firms and for the privatisation of 
previously state owned companies 
  Start-ups  Restructuring (privatised firms) 
 
Financial sources 
% of all 
start-ups  




% of all 
privatised firms 




Own savings of main owner  89.4  67.3  46.9  55.1 
Borrowing from friends and 
family 
25.7 34.6  12.6  20.6 
Foreign capital  10.3  56.1  3.9  22.9 
Investment from other 
private firms 
18.4 51.6  15.5  38.9 
Supplier credit  9.9  45.7  2.9  30.0 
Commercial or investment 
Loans 
8.8 49.0  5.8  45 
Government program  3.1  49.0  55.3  65.2 
Other 



















Source: own calculations 
(1) Counting the firms that used that particular financial source only.  Note that the 
percentages do not sum to 100 since quite a number of firms used more than one financial 
source.  Of all de novo firms, 46% used one single source, 38% used two sources, 12 % used 
three and 4 % used four different sources to finance start-up.  For the privatised firms the 
percentages are respectively: 52%, 28%, 10% and 9%. 
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